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Abstract: The impact of the USA’s agoa preferences on SSA countries is studied using a matching
approach. The results indicate that agoa beneficiaries have exported less to the USA compared to their
matched controls. However, this has not been the case for their exports to the EU which has seen a higher
share of exports relative to the control group. In addition, the results show that, in the short–run the SSA
countries reduce exports to the EU in order to take advantage of agoa. Thus, due to capacity constraints
these countries switched exports from the EU to the USA market. China, OECD, European and other
developed countries are excluded from the control group used in the analysis. We therefore do not expect
the strengths of these economies to be driving any of our results.
1 Email: e.f.a.cooke@sussex.ac.uk. Comments on this preliminary version are welcome.
1 Introduction
The importance of trade in fostering the growth of developing countries cannot be overempha-
sised (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Neuhaus, 2005). The experience of the East Asian miracle
countries as well as China and India in Asia are interesting examples in this case. A proliferation
of studies showing that trade provides an additional source of growth beyond what exist under
the tradional Solow model include Frankel and Romer (1999); Neuhaus (2005) among others.
It is based on this that the study of agoa provided by the USA for Sub Saharan African (SSA)
countries to promote their exports to the USA is important. The provision of these preferences
is expected to spur exports to the USA and have a direct and indirect feedback effect on their
respective economies. The direct effects would be the increased jobs and opportunities created
by the increased access to the USA market. The indirect effects on the other hand, would be
other opportunities and the service industry that arise to support the increased economic activity
as a result of increased exports.
There exists a considerable number of studies studying the impact of agoa on the benefi-
ciaries (for example, Collier and Venables, 2007; Condon and Stern, 2011; Seyoum, 2007;
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008; Tadesse et al., 2008; Nouve
and Staatz, 2003; Nouve, 2005). We add to this literature by trying to estimating the impact of
agoa on beneficiary countries using a novel methodological approach that is becoming popular
in the economic literature. Existing studies base their analysis on traditional econometrics
(these include, Lederman and Özden, 2007; Nouve, 2005; Seyoum, 2007) while others use the
evaluation methodology (for instance, Collier and Venables, 2007; Frazer and Van Biesebroeck,
2010). In this paper, we attempt to use a matching approach to carry out the analysis. The
problem in studying the impact is that the counter-factual is not available. Thus matching is a
way of constructing a counter-factual to measure the impact.
In matching agoa countries to other developing countries we use a vector of variables
containing characteristics of both countries to make the match. It is assumed that there is
independence between the treatment and the controls. Previous studies (for example Collier
and Venables, 2007; GAO, 2008; USITC, 2007) point to large increases in the exports of agoa
beneficiaries to the USA. One could therefore compare the exports to the USA by agoa recipients
to the counter-factual to test whether there was a significant increase compared to non–agoa
countries. Nevertheless, the coefficients of both regressions can be compared to observe the size
of the changes compared to non–agoa recipients
The main question asked in this paper is "Whether there has been an observed increase in
the exports of agoa recipients to the USA compared to the counter-factual (other non–agoa
countries)?" A related question is, whether exports to the European Union decreased in response
to the agoa adoption compared to the counter-factual countries. To start us off in answering this
question we consider the following objectives:
• To provide appropriate matching and evaluation frameworks for the agoa countries export-
ing to the USA to provide a causal explanation of any increase in exports.
• Match agoa countries to other developing countries using identifiable characteristics
and features such as economic size, distance to international markets, common colonial
heritage, common language, religion, capital/labour intensities and cultural background
among others.
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The two main hypotheses to be tested in the paper are
• agoa countries export less to the USA than other developing countries after controlling for
similar characteristics.
• agoa exports have displaced apparel and textile exports to the European Union.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents some of the basic
stylised facts of our export data. The third section discusses the data and methodology used,
followed by a discussion of the results obtained. The final section concludes the paper.
2 Exploring the Data
Figure (1) plots the share of exports to the USA against the share of exports to the EU for selected
agoa countries. The size of the bubbles represent total exports for each country. The graphs
show some observable decrease in the share of exports to the EU and a slight increase in the
share of exports to the USA. Figures (2) – (3) plot the trends in the share of exports to the USA.
Due to the larger shares of Lesotho and Nigeria, they are shown in a separate diagram. The share
of exports have increased in certain cases but has not been sustained throughout the period. In
addition, the impact of agoa has a lagged effect in increasing the share of exports to the USA.
The two remaining figures in this section, Figures (4) – (5) show the trends in actual exports to
the USA. In all six cases, exports to the USA have increased post agoa. Nigeria, by far shows the
highest increase in the value of its exports to the USA. This indicates an increase in exports to
the USA by agoa beneficiaries. However, these increases are not reflected in the shares of their
exports to the USA out of total exports. This might point towards the positive impact found in
the agoa impact literature which use the value of exports to the USA as the dependent variable.
The shares of exports to the USA might tell a different story if used in the analysis presented in
the literature so far.
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Figure 1: Export shares to the EU and USA — selected year
Figure 2: Share of Exports to the USA — 1993 – 2010
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Figure 3: Share of Exports to the USA — 1993 – 2010
Figure 4: Total Exports to the USA — 1993 – 2010
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Figure 5: Total Exports to the USA — 1993 – 2010
3 Data and Econometric Approach
The matching approach is expected to provide a causal explanation to whatever increases in
exports of agoa countries we observe. Since we do not observe what the exports of these
countries would be after the enactment of agoa, we use countries that were not provided these
preferences as the counter–factual. The assumption is that these countries would provide us with
the trend in exports that we would have observed in our preference beneficiaries. Thus, after
matching—an increase in exports of preference beneficiaries would imply that the preferences
have contributed to higher exports from the beneficiary countries. We can therefore attribute
this difference, to their preferential status. However, if there is no difference in exports, then
the preferences might not have been the main instrument in the export performance of the
preferential beneficiaries. Matching is done on similar economic, political, cultural and other
factors in order to limit the influence of these characteristics in driving our results.
E[y1− y0|X = 1] = E[y1|z,X = 1]−E[y0|z,X = 1] (1)
S(z) = Pr(X = 1|z) (2)
P(agoa) = F(z) (3)
agoa=
{
1 if agoa bene f iciary
0 otherwise
κssa,dev = arg min |Pˆssa− Pˆdev| (4)
Where: X is the agoa treatment, y is either the share of USA or EU exports in the total exports of
country j and z - is a vector of variables used in estimating the propensity score for matching agoa
beneficiaries to non-agoa developing countries. This vector includes economic variables, political
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variables, country characteristics and other variables such as latitude, landlocked, physical capital per
worker, land per worker among others. The t subscript is not shown in order not to clutter the equations
above and for ease of exposition.
Equation (1) defines the problem at hand. We seek to find the difference between the
outcome variable before and after the treatment. However, it is difficult to observe E[y0|z,X = 1]
— the counter-factual. Hence, the counter-factual is constructed by selecting countries with
characteristics similar to our treated countries — E[y0|z,X = 1] = E[y0|z,X = 0]. The countries
are matched based on the vector z—allowing us to select countries that are very similar prior
to the treatment. When matching is done well it allows for a causal inference to be made
(Yasar and Rejesus, 2005). This allows a comparison to be made and thus any difference in the
outcome variables can be attributed to the preference1. The vector y1 is the outcome variable for
the treated group (agoa beneficiaries) and y0 is that of the control group created (that is, our
manufactured counter-factual for the agoa group of countries). Equation (2) is the propensity
score in general form estimated conditional on the vector of characteristics. This is estimated via
a logit regression (Equation (3) and the predictions from this regression becomes our propensity
score used for matching agoa recipients to non-agoa countries. Equation (4) specifies that
countries with propensity scores (Pˆ) close to each other are matched together—as they are
similar, based on the covariates chosen.
In matching, it is often difficult obtaining a match. In order to avoid this problem, we could
match our propensity score using the nearest neighbour matching or the caliper matching
methods. In the nearest neighbour, preference beneficiaries and non preference beneficia-
ries are randomly ordered and the non preference beneficiaries with the score closest to
the beneficiary is selected. The caliper matching on the contrary, requires us to define a
region of common support–(δ ) and randomly select non preference beneficiaries that have a
similar propensity score. We would experiment with calipers in the region of 0.5, 0.1, 0.05
and 0.005 to check the sensitivity of our results to the caliper chosen. The caliper match is
given as, δ > | ˆPssa− ˆPdev|= arg min |Pˆssa−Pˆdev|, where dev and ssa are as defined earlier above.
Data is obtained from several sources. The World Development Indicators and IMFs
International Financial Statistics databases provide macroeconomic indicators (such as, gross
domestic product, inflation, population, value-added (in industry, manufacturing, agriculture,
construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange rates among others) for the purposes of
matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s Global Governance2, Database of Political
Institutions3, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)4 databases provide political, cultural and religious
data to augment our vector of control variables needed to perform a realistic match.
1 Some of the literature on matching include Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008);
Heckman et al. (1997); Imbens and Angrist (1994); Hirano et al. (2003); Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985); Imbens
(2010)
2 www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
3 Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic
Review.
4 Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, "Other Political Data
(updated 2005)", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Murray Research
Archive [Distributor] V1 [Version]
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Our data is a panel of 40 treated countries from SSA and some 80 – 90 control countries
(developing countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as North Africa) for the
years 1991 – 2010. Nielsen and Sheffield (2009) note that longitudinal data can create problems
for matching—this is due to what they call the, “double dimensionality of panel data”. They
also discuss some of the ways in which researchers have attempted to get around the problem.
The matching is done in three different ways based on the data available taking into account the
concerns of Nielsen and Sheffield (2009). The three approaches undertaken here allow us to
check the sensitivity and robustness of the results as well as get around the problem due to the
longitudinal data.
1. Matching is performed on the longitudinal data available. In this case, data for our
propensity score covariates for the pre-agoa years (1991 – 2000) are used in creating the
match. And the matches are used in analysing data for the post agoa years for our outcome
variables—share of USA exports in total exports (and share of EU exports in total exports
for comparison)
2. Matching is done on the data individually for each year and combined. The matched
dataset is then used on data for the post agoa years on the outcome variables.
3. Matching is done on a cross-section. Here the pre-agoa and post agoa periods are aggre-
gated into single periods by taking the means for the time series for each country. Then
the pre-agoa controls are used in matching the data. The matched data is then used in
analysing the outcome variables.
4 Discussion of Results
The results indicate that agoa beneficiaries have exported less to the USA compared to their
matched controls. However, this has not been the case for their exports to the EU which has seen
a higher share of exports relative to the control group. In addition, the results show that, in the
short–run the SSA countries reduce exports to the EU in order to take advantage of agoa. Thus,
due to capacity constraints these countries switched exports from the EU to the USA market.
China, OECD, European and other developed countries are excluded from the control group
used in the analysis. We therefore do not expect the strengths of these economies to be driving
any of our results. The results are discussed in detail in the next three sub–sections.
Panel Analysis
The results so far point to a negative impact of AGOA. Essentially, after controlling for particular
characteristics agoa beneficiaries tend to export a lesser share of their exports to the USA
compared to their control groups of other developing countries. Various tests for our models
are passed. For instance, the balancing property for each covariate in each block is passed. In
addition, all matching is done on common support (that is, the overlapping region of the two
distributions are used in the match).
Table (1) shows the results in the longitudinal case. Here we match based on a panel of data
prior to agoa (1991–2000). The matches created are then used on data from 2001 – 2010 to
calculate the average treatment effect of agoa. From the table, all the USA results point to lower
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exports out of total exports to the USA. In the unmatched sample the difference is 10.4% lower,
while in the matched sample the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) ranges from 4.5%
– 6.6%. The difference between the agoa and non-agoa countries are not significant in the third
row (here the matching covariates are different). However, in the first case these are significant.
For exports to the EU the differences are significant in both cases and we see a higher export to
the EU compared to the control group. The ATT varies from 8.5% – 11.9%.
matching covariates are log of the real exchange rate; military state (0,1); log of physical capital per worker; and land per worker
Figure 6: Common support for case 1
Table 1: Average Treatment Effect
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat Treateda Untreateda
Exports to USA/Totalb Unmatched .068 .172 -.104 .013 -8.24 222 575
ATT .068 .134 -.066 .024 -2.76 222 575
Exports to EU/Totalb Unmatched .378 .242 .136 .016 8.35 222 575
ATT .391 .273 .119 .030 3.91 222 575
Exports to USA/Totalc Unmatched .068 .171 -.103 .013 -8.13 561 233
ATT .067 .114 -.045 .0234 -1.92 561 233
ATU .177 .104 -.074 561 233
ATE -.065 561 233
Exports to EU/Totalc Unmatched .378 .246 .132 .016 8.09 561 233
ATT .382 .297 .085 .035 2.44 561 233
ATU .255 .458 .204 561 233
ATE .169 561 233
a Observations on common support.
b Matching covariates: real gdp per capita; openness; shares of consumption, investment and government
spending out of gdp; services growth; trade growth; gdp growth; military rule.
c real gdp per worker (chain); real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); services growth; and gdp growth.
ATE = Average treatment effect; ATT = average treatment on the treated; ATU = average treatment on the
untreated.
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated.
Table (2) carries out the analysis for each year separately and combines the estimated
propensity into a panel and then the analysis is carried out on the post-agoa years. Again we
find results consistent with Table (1). The USA ATT results are again negative and vary between
5.6% and 10.6%. The EU results are also positive varying between 7.9% and 12.8%. In the table
an attempt is made to use three different matching methods.
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• Kernel matching - this uses a kernel to define the match and allows one to define various
bandwidths within which to allow matches.
• Nearest neighbourhood matching - finds the nearest control country with the closest
propensity score as the agoa country.
• Radius matching - matching is carried out based on a defined radius and control and treated
countries falling within this radius are matched.
In the table, various bandwidths and radii are used to check the sensitivity of the results. Again
the results are quite close to each other and there are no sign reversals. Additionally, all results
are significant.
Table 2: Average treatment effect on the treated — ATT
country # treated # of controls ATT–coefficient std. errora t-stat matching method bandwidth/radius
EU 216 396 .093 .028 3.373 Kernel bandwidth=0.01
EU 216 396 .099 .027 3.616 Kernel bandwidth=0.06
EU 216 101 .079 .031 2.526 Nearest Neighbour
EU 216 396 .128 .02 6.26 Radius radius=0.05
EU 172 354 .127 .028 4.501 Radius radius=0.005
EU 216 396 .122 .018 6.616 Radius radius=0.5
EU 216 396 .127 .021 6.116 Radius radius=0.1
USA 216 396 -.056 .019 -2.991 Kernel bandwidth=0.01
USA 216 396 -.063 .018 -3.603 Kernel bandwidth=0.06
USA 216 101 -.073 .021 -3.456 Nearest Neighbour
USA 216 396 -.1 .012 -8.05 Radius radius=0.5
USA 172 354 -.106 .019 -5.507 Radius radius=0.005
USA 216 396 -.103 .014 -7.488 Radius radius=0.1
USA 216 396 -.105 .014 -7.543 Radius radius=0.05
a Bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications reported.
matching covariates are real gdp per worker (chain); real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); income group (WB definition); religion and log of area
Figure 7: Common support for case 2 (Table (2))
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Yearly Analysis
Tables (3) – (4) provide annual results. The trend of results is similar to that reported earlier. The
exports to the USA again (see Table 3), show that agoa recipients exported significantly less than
their matched control countries. A few years display a positive albeit insignificant coefficient
of the ATT. A large number of the years are significant but the earlier years (prior to 2004) do
show a number of significant results compared to later years. Table (4) on the other hand, reports
results for exports to the EU. There are more significant and positive results reported here. A
difference is that later years (2009 & 2010) are significantly negative. This could be due to
several reasons. For example, this is the period of the credit crunch which affected exports of de-
veloping countries as well as the ability of EU and the USA to keep imports at the previous levels.
Table 3: Calculated Yearly Treatment Effects — Exports to the USA/Total Exports
year measure obs # of matches coefficient std. error z prob>z 95% conf. interval
2001 SATE 82 1 -.11 .068 -1.62 0.105 -.242 .023
2001 SATT 82 1 .049 .047 1.02 0.305 -.044 .142
2001 SATC 82 1 -.183 .081 -2.26 0.024 -.341 -.024
2002 SATE 84 1 -.16 .123 -1.3 0.194 -.402 .081
2002 SATT 84 1 .163 .064 2.55 0.011 .038 .289
2002 SATC 84 1 -.305 .147 -2.08 0.038 -.593 -.017
2003 SATE 86 1 -.135 .128 -1.05 0.293 -.387 .117
2003 SATT 86 1 .116 .113 1.02 0.306 -.106 .337
2003 SATC 86 1 -.263 .156 -1.68 0.093 -.569 .043
2004 SATE 89 1 -.301 .096 -3.15 0.002 -.489 -.114
2004 SATT 89 1 -.228 .095 -2.39 0.017 -.415 -.041
2004 SATC 89 1 -.337 .117 -2.87 0.004 -.567 -.107
2005 SATE 88 1 -.301 .414 -0.73 0.468 -1.111 .51
2005 SATT 88 1 .205 .631 0.32 0.746 -1.033 1.442
2005 SATC 88 1 -.536 .373 -1.44 0.151 -1.267 .195
2006 SATE 87 1 -.197 .141 -1.4 0.161 -.473 .079
2006 SATT 87 1 .041 .093 0.44 0.659 -.141 .223
2006 SATC 87 1 -.299 .177 -1.69 0.092 -.646 .049
2007 SATE 80 1 -.12 .078 -1.53 0.126 -.274 .034
2007 SATT 80 1 -.144 .042 -3.44 0.001 -.227 -.062
2007 SATC 80 1 -.109 .101 -1.08 0.28 -.308 .089
2008 SATE 74 1 -.062 .219 -0.28 0.777 -.491 .368
2008 SATT 74 1 .013 .191 0.07 0.945 -.361 .388
2008 SATC 74 1 -.094 .268 -0.35 0.726 -.618 .431
2009 SATE 65 1 -.065 .071 -0.91 0.361 -.204 .074
2009 SATT 65 1 -.037 .035 -1.03 0.302 -.106 .033
2009 SATC 65 1 -.075 .092 -0.82 0.414 -.256 .105
2010 SATE 29 1 -.049 .072 -0.68 0.496 -.191 .092
2010 SATT 29 1 .039 .073 0.53 0.593 -.104 .183
2010 SATC 29 1 -.089 .078 -1.14 0.256 -.242 .065
Matching variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; distance to
international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification); religion; log of
area
Bias-adj variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; distance to
international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification); religion; log of
area
SATC: Average Treatment for the Controls; SATE: Average Treatment Effect; SATT: Average Treated for the Treated
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Table 4: Calculated Yearly Treatment Effects–Exports to the EU/Total Exports
year measure obs # of matches coefficient std. errora z prob>z 95% conf. interval
2001 SATE 82 1 .564 .323 1.75 0.081 -.069 1.197
2001 SATT 82 1 .235 .15 1.57 0.117 -.059 .528
2001 SATC 82 1 .717 .425 1.69 0.092 -.116 1.55
2002 SATE 84 1 .485 .154 3.15 0.002 .183 .786
2002 SATT 84 1 .126 .089 1.41 0.158 -.049 .301
2002 SATC 84 1 .645 .185 3.49 0 .283 1.007
2003 SATE 86 1 .197 .131 1.5 0.134 -.06 .455
2003 SATT 86 1 -.077 .13 -0.59 0.555 -.331 .178
2003 SATC 86 1 .336 .153 2.21 0.027 .038 .635
2004 SATE 89 1 .138 .165 0.84 0.403 -.185 .462
2004 SATT 89 1 -.299 .287 -1.04 0.296 -.861 .262
2004 SATC 89 1 .35 .106 3.3 0.001 .142 .557
2005 SATE 88 1 -4.42 6.62 -0.67 0.504 -17.395 8.555
2005 SATT 88 1 -.019 1.348 -0.01 0.989 -2.66 2.623
2005 SATC 88 1 -6.474 9.565 -0.68 0.498 -25.222 12.273
2006 SATE 87 1 .06 .249 0.24 0.81 -.428 .547
2006 SATT 87 1 .177 .151 1.18 0.239 -.118 .472
2006 SATC 87 1 .01 .326 0.03 0.976 -.63 .649
2007 SATE 80 1 .145 .079 1.83 0.068 -.01 .3
2007 SATT 80 1 .131 .083 1.59 0.113 -.031 .293
2007 SATC 80 1 .15 .094 1.6 0.109 -.034 .335
2008 SATE 74 1 1.252 1.721 0.73 0.467 -2.121 4.625
2008 SATT 74 1 .226 .184 1.23 0.22 -.135 .586
2008 SATC 74 1 1.687 2.228 0.76 0.449 -2.68 6.053
2009 SATE 65 1 .314 .168 1.87 0.061 -.015 .644
2009 SATT 65 1 -.263 .15 -1.75 0.079 -.557 .031
2009 SATC 65 1 .536 .162 3.3 0.001 .218 .853
2010 SATE 29 1 -.187 .225 -0.83 0.407 -.629 .255
2010 SATT 29 1 .284 .148 1.93 0.054 -.005 .573
2010 SATC 29 1 -.399 .244 -1.64 0.102 -.877 .079
a Bootstrapped standard errors reported above with 50 replications.
Matching variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; dis-
tance to international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification);
religion; log of area
Bias-adj variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; dis-
tance to international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification);
religion; log of area
SATC: Average Treatment for the Controls; SATE: Average Treatment Effect; SATT: Average Treated for
the Treated
Cross-Section Analysis
The final set of tables, Table (5) and (6) present results for the constructed cross-section data.
Exports to the USA is negative and significant in Table (5) but that of the EU is positive and
insignificant. Table (6) carries out the analysis by varying the matching covariates. The USA
result are consistently negative but significant in the second row of the table and insignificant
in the remaining two entries. Similarly, the EU results are positive and significant in the first
row but insignificant in the remaining rows. In the third row, however, the EU results become
negative although they are insignificant. This might be due to the sample size and combination
of matching covariates. However, this does not take much away from the present results as the
EU and USA results have been consistent in all tables and have been robust to various sensitivity
and robustness analysis carried out.
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Table 5: Calculated Treatment Effects — Cross-section
Outcome measure obs # of matches coefficient std. errora z prob>z 95% conf. interval
Exports to USA/Total SATE 90 1 -0.211 0.120 -1.76 0.078 -0.446 0.024
Exports to EU/Total SATC 90 1 .270 .206 1.31 0.190 -0.134 0.673
a Bootstrapped standard error with 100 replications.
Matching variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; distance to
international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification); religion; log of
area
Bias-adj variables: real gdp per worker (Laspeyres); real gdp per worker (chain); services growth; distance to
international markets; landlocked; latitude; longitude; income group (based on WB classification); religion; log of
area
SATC: Average Treatment for the Controls; SATE: Average Treatment Effect; SATT: Average Treated for the Treated
Table 6: Average treatment effect on the treated — Share of exports
country # treated # of controls ATT–coefficient std. errora t-stat
EU 33 44 0.019 0.086 0.22
USA 33 44 -0.160 0.086 -1.856
EU 26 12 -0.025 0.148 -0.169
USA 26 12 -0.167 0.122 -1.369
EU 33 44 0.031 0.117 0.262
USA 33 44 -0.173 0.113 -1.538
a Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications reported.
Rows 1 & 2 matching variables: real gdp per worker (chain); real gdp perworker
(Laspeyres); services growth; landlocked; income group (WB classification); re-
ligion
Rows 3 & 4 matching variables: real gdp per worker (chain); real gdp perworker
(Laspeyres); services growth; income group (WB classification); religion; hu-
man capital; land per person; log of area; log of physical capital per worker
Rows 5 & 6 matching variables: real gdp per worker (chain); real gdp perworker
(Laspeyres); services growth; income group (WB classification); religion; con-
sumption, investment and government spending shares in gdp; openness; log of
real exchange rate
Finally, the graphs below show the degree of overlap between our treated and control countries
for the other cases where we varied the matching covariates. They do show a reasonable degree
of overlap and support the tests of common support that were passed in all six cases.
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(a) Case A (b) Case B - CS (c) Case C - CS
(d) Case D - CS (e) Case E - CS (f) Case F - CS
Graphs showing other combinations of covariates. Not all results are shown above. Cases B - F are based on the cross-section constructed, see Table (5).
Figure 8: Common Support for other cases
5 Conclusion
The results presented so far imply that agoa beneficiaries have exported less to the USA
compared to their matched controls. However, this has not been the case for their exports to the
EU which has seen a higher share of exports relative to the control group. Initial implications
from the result could be that, the shorter distance to the EU compared to non-agoa countries
makes the EU a much better export destination for their exports. This probably is what is
showing in the positive ATT estimates for the share of EU exports. Distance might not be the
only factor at work here, but also the composition of exports. The EU allows a much varied
array of exports from African Caribbean and Pacific countries under their various preferential
programmes—this might be what is driving the positive coefficient. Moreover, the exports of
agoa beneficiaries to the USA are mainly driven by apparel and textile products as well as energy
products. Thus several agoa beneficiaries that do not export these products might be driving the
negative coefficient as well as the nearness of Latin American and Caribbean countries to the
USA market. China, OECD, European and other developed countries were excluded from the
control group of countries. We therefore do not expect the strengths of these economies to be
driving any of our results.
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A caveat to the results is that the estimates are all intention to treat estimates. Further analysis
needs to be done to capture the actual average treatment effects for the exports to the USA. This
would be done with data on USA imports obtained from the USITC website.
There are a few more things to be done. (1) Incorporating a matched — difference-in-
difference approach on the matched units; (2) Varying the outcome variables to include other
definitions, such as gsp imports into the USA/total imports into the USA; total non-preferential
imports/total imports into the USA; and sectoral level variable definitions (e.g., apparel, textiles,
WTO agricultural exports; Industrial exports and comesa-cet1 exports out of total sector or total
exports); (3) Including corruption indicators. These additional analysis would be helpful in
further ensuring the robustness of our results and provide us with more information on the impact
of agoa. It would also make it possible to show both the short and long–run effects of the agoa
preference as well as provide information as to which sectors have benefited the most and how
countries have re-organised their exports. At the least, the present paper has started a debate into
trying out new methods of analysing agoa to show some consistent results.
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